The One-Man Corporation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Agains Self-Incrimination by Battisti, Anthony M.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 1 
Issue 2 Volume 1, 1986, Issue 2 Article 5 
March 1986 
The One-Man Corporation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege 
Agains Self-Incrimination 
Anthony M. Battisti 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Battisti, Anthony M. (1986) "The One-Man Corporation and the Fifth Amendment Privilege Agains Self-
Incrimination," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol1/iss2/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
THE ONE-MAN CORPORATION AND
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution guaran-
tees that no person will be compelled to testify against himself.,
This privilege is intended to protect the individual from divulging
information that might be incriminating,2 and as such it is per-
' U.S. Cows-r. amend. V. The fifth amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
vides in relevant part: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself . I..." d. This fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-
incrimination has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). While the existence of this privi-
lege in the United States dates back to the adoption of the Bill of Rights, an Anglo-Ameri-
can legal tradition which dates back to the thirteenth century undergirds the privilege. M.
BERGER, TAKING THE FIrn 39 (1980). See generally L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMEND-
MENT 55-80 (1968) (definitive history of the fifth amendment); Pittman, The Colonial and
Constitutional History of the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763
(1935) (detailed treatment of historical development of privilege against self-incrimination).
Though leaving few clues, the Framers intimated that the fifth amendment typified their
estimation that "in a free society, based on respect for the individual, the determination of
guilt or innocence by just procedures, in which the accused made no unwilling contribution
to his conviction, was more important than punishing the guilty." L. LEVY, supra, at 430-
32. Attempts to identify the policies which underlie the privilege againt self-incrimination
have not produced unanimous results. See Comment, On Claiming the Fifth Amendment for
Mixed Purpose Documents: The Problem of Categorizing Documents as Personal or Corporate in a
Business Setting, 17 U.S.F.L. REV. 333, 344-45 (1983). The Supreme Court of the United
States articulated its perception of what the privilege against self-incrimination stands for
in Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). The Court stated:
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our fundamental values
and most noble aspirations: our unwillingness to subject those suspect of crime to
the cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial system of criminal justice; our fear that self-
incriminating statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; ... our
respect for the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each indi-
vidual 'to a private enclave where he may lead a private life;' our distrust of self-
deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes 'a
shelter to the guilty,' is often a 'protection for the innocent.'
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964). For a critical evaluation of the
language used by the Murphy Court see M. BERGER, supra, at 27-57.1 See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 372-73 (1951); United States v. Gordon, 236
F.2d 916, 919 (2d Cir. 1956); see also C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 121 (1984); see generally
M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 81-88 (general discussion of type of incrimination which impli-
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sonal in nature and may only be asserted by an individual on his
own behalf.3
Courts and grand juries have the power to issue a subpoena du-
ces tecum which commands the production of documents, papers,
and other physical items.4 It is well established that no fifth
amendment privilege attaches to the contents of these documents
even when the information was recorded by the accused party.3
However, the "act of producing" the item does trigger the privi-
lege, since the act itself does involve some implicit testimonial
communication on the part of the producer.6 Upon production of
cates fifth amendment). The rationale behind the privilege against self-incrimination is that
a person should not be forced to articulate information that could be used as evidence
against him. See Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 87 (1974); United States v. White, 322
U.S. 694, 698 (1944); see also 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 (McNaughten rev. 1940)
(object of protection is extracting from person's own lips an admission of guilt).
3 United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1944); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. I.C.C.,
227 U.S. 612, 622 (1911): Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69 (1906). A person may not
invoke his fifth amendment privilege on behalf of another, nor may he claim a violation of
the privilege when a third party is called to testify as to matters which would incriminate
the person invoking the privilege. Hale, 201 U.S. at 69-70; see also C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 2, § 120 (criminal defendant may not invoke privilege of witnesses, codefendants or
co-conspirators). See generally M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 57-66 (general discussion of fifth
amendment privilege as a personal right).
" E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 45; FEm. R. CRIM. P. 17. See generally C. McCoRMIcK, supra note 2, §
126 (general discussion of subpoena duces tecum).
' Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409-10 & n.lI (1976); Note, Organizational Pa-
pers and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 99 HARV. L. REv. 640, 644-45 (1986). The
seminal case which established the proposition that private documents were protected from
compelled production was Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). In Boyd, Boyd was
ordered to produce the invoices of cases of plate glass which had been illegally imported.
Id. at 617-18. The Court considered the invoices to be Boyd's private property and de-
nounced "any forcible and compulsory extortion of a man's own testimony or of his private
papers to be used as evidence to convict him .. " Id. at 630. It has been suggested that
the Fisher case signalled the demise of the privacy doctrine posited in Boyd. United States v.
Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 618 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (Fisher sounded the "death
knell" for Boyd); see also Comment, supra note 1, at 339. Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Self-
Incrimination and Private Papers in the Birger Court,.27 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 343 (1979) (rise and
fall of Boyd doctrine); Glanzer, Schiffman, and Packman, The Use of the Fifth Amendment in
SEC Investigations, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 895, 904 (1984) (Fisher shifted the focus away
from contents to the act of production); McKenna, The Constitutional Protection of Private
Papers: The Role of a Heirarchical Fourth Amendment, 53 IND. L.J. 55, 62 (1977-78) (Boyd's
analytic basis undermined by Fisher).
' Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410. In Fisher a summons was served on a taxpayer requiring the
production of worksheets prepared by his accountant. Id. at 394. The papers, however,
were held by the taxpayer's attorney. Id. The attorney refused to comply with the sum-
mons, claiming that it would involve a violation of the taxpayer's privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 395. The Court stated that the fifth amendment is violated only when
a subpoena compels incriminating testimonial communications. Id. at 409. On the facts of
the Fisher case, the Court held that compliance with the summons involved no such incrim-
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the documents an individual impliedly communicates that the doc-
uments were in his possession or control, that the documents pro-
duced are those that are demanded, and that the documents pro-
duced exist.7 These implications arise from the act of production
which has been considered a compelled incriminating testimonial
communication. 8
As a general rule, the privilege against compelled self-incrimina-
tion may not be invoked by a corporation.9 The rationale es-
poused is that since the corporation is not a personal entity, but
rather an entity of the state,10 it can act only through its officers
or agents in transacting business.1 Accordingly, the corporation is
not an "individual" and may not assert the privilege on its own
behalf,12 nor may any of its officers or agents refuse to testify or
produce the material requested by invoking his personal fifth
amendment privilege.18 Recently, in the wake of two circuit courts
inating testimony. Id. at 414. For a general discussion of the Fisher case, see Note, supra
note 5, at 643-50; Note, The Rights of Criminal Defendants and the Subpoena Duces Tecum:
The Aftermath of Fisher v. United States, 95 HARv. L REV. 683 (1982); Note, Business
Records and the Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 351, 360-
61 (1977).
7 Fisher, 425 U.S, at 410; C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 126.
8 See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated June 13 and June 22, 1983, 722
F.2d 981, 984 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 597 F.2d
851, 860 (3d Cir. 1979); Segmond v. United States, 589 F. Supp. 568, 575-76 (S.D.N.Y.
1984).
9 Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1913); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43
(1906); C. McCoRMICK, supra note 2, § 128; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2259. See gener-
ally M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 57-66.
10 Hale, 201 U.S. 43, 74-75 (1906). As an entity of the state the corporation is subject to
the state's right of visitation, that is, "the right to inspect the corporation's books and
records, to assure that the entity is not abusing its powers." C. MCORMzcK, supra note 2, §
128; M. BERGERt, supra note 1, at 59; see also Hale, 201 U.S. at 74-75; In re Two Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, One Dated January 28, 1985, the other undated, appeal docketed,
No. 85-8067 (2d Cir. July 28, 1985).
11 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 374-75 (1911); In re Grand jury Empanelled
March 8, 1983, 722 F.2d 294, 297 (6th Cir. 1983); H.W. BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORA-
TIoNs § 6 (1927); C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 128.
12 See Comment, supra note 1, at 335-36 (fifth amendment only protects natural persons).
Corporations have been considered persons for other constitutional purposes. E.g., Gibson
v. Florida Legislative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 543-44 (1963) (association protected under
fourteenth amendment Due Process Clause); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 522 (1898)
(corporation's property protected by Due Process Clause). See M. BERGER, supra note 1, at
57-58.
18 Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911); see McPaul v. United States, 364 U.S.
372, 380 (1960); 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 2259(b). See generally Tragos, The Corporate
Officer Versus the Fifth Amendment, 55 FLA. BJ. 52 (1981) (what criminal practitioners should
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of appeal decisions, some confusion has surfaced with regard to
the applicability of the fifth amendment privilege to one-man cor-
porations.1 4 This article will discuss these cases and the impor-
tance of the wording of the subpoena duces tecum. In addition, cer-
tain relevant legal precepts will be analyzed, and this article will
ultimately conclude that the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination should be afforded to the sole owner
of a one-man corporation.
I. RECENT DECISIONS
Recently, in In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown),1 5 the sole owner of
a professional corporation, Brown, was served with a subpoena du-
ces tecum compelling him to produce certain papers.1 6 Brown con-
tended that the act of production pursuant to the subpoena would
be an authentication of the documents requested and would,
therefore, be a compelled incriminating testimonial communica-
tion. 1 In this case it was clearly established that the government
sought to compel Brown to testify as to the authenticity of the
records.18 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit quashed
the subpoena, sustaining the invocation of the privilege.19 In addi-
tion, the court noted that the wording of the subpoena was what
made the production of the documents a compelled incriminating
testimonial communication. 0
know when representing corporate clients).
1, See infra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
1s 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc).
Id. at 531. The subpoena read:
You are hereby commanded to appear in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania . . . and bring with you all workpapers, reports,
records, correspondences and copies of tax retu'ns in your possession or under your
control relating to accounting services performed by you or under your supervision on be-
half of the below listed persons or entities for the years 1977 through 1982.
Id. (emphasis in original).
'7 Id. at 526.
', Id. at 529. The court reasoned that the government "candidly concedes that what it
wants amounts to compelled authentication testimony which may later be used against the
target of a grand jury investigation." Id.
1" Id. The court held that a sole stockholder of a professional corporation could not be
required to supply the prosecutor with evidence which the prosecutor intended to use
against him. Id.
"I Id. at 531; see infra note 37 and accompanying text.
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In In Re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum,21 two sub-
poenae duces tecum were issued to a corporation and its sole
owner, demanding the production of certain corporate records. 2
The owner maintained that if he complied with the subpoena that
was issued to him directly, he would be compelled to supply in-
criminating testimony against himself.23 After the district court
limited the subpoena to the production of business records,24 the
owner attempted to assert his privilege on behalf of the corpora-
tion. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
held that the producer of the documents was not to be accorded
the privilege against self-incrimination because the custodian was
never personally requested to produce any documents.2 5 The sub-
poena placed the burden of production upon the corporation,
which could produce the documents through a non-target em-
ployee.' The appellant argued that his business was inherently a
sole proprietorship, and that as such the subpoena was in essence
compelling production from him personally,27 and not from a col-
lective entity.28 The court rejected this argument, reasoning that
an individual cannot prevent a corporation from producing its
records pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum by asserting his per-
sonal fifth amendment privilege.2
11 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985).
22 Id. at 54.
23 See id. The court reasoned that the facts in In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces
Tecum did not put the case within the limited scope of Fisher since the appellant was not
compelled to make any incriminating testimonial communication. Id.
"Id. at 54.
Id. at 55.
20 Id. The court concluded:
Only the corporation is being directed to produce the records, and it is directed to
produce them not through the act of the custodian who is appealing, but through
the act of some other employee or agent who is not a grand jury target.
Id.
2 See id. at 54. The appellant attempted to rely on the holding in United States v. Doe,
465 U.S. 605 (1984), which allowed a sole proprietor to assert his fifth amendment privi-
lege with respect to the records of his business. Appellant sought to equate his business
with a sole proprietorship in that although it is technically a corporation, appellant is the
sole operating officer in a capacity equal to that of a sole proprietor. See infra note 41 and
accompanying text.
"See infra note 45.
21 In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 56 (2d Cir. 1985).
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II. PROPOSED ANALYSES
A. Substance Over Form
Very often courts will examine the substance of a corporation
over its form to determine its status with respect to the law con-
trolling the issues of a particular case.30 That is, the courts have
focused on the incorporator's intention for forming the corpora-
tion, and the corporation's compliance with the controlling incor-
poration statutes to determine if the organization is a corporation
in the true sense of the term, or rather an entity using the corpo-
rate form for some ulterior purpose.31 In these cases the individ-
ual operating the corporate entity and the entity itself are deemed
inseparable. 2 It is submitted that such is the case in one-man cor-
30 See, e.g., Inryco, Inc. v. CGR Bldg. Sys. Inc., 780 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1986) (owners of
a corporation insufficiently funded could not use corporate form to escape liability as it
would exalt form over substance); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir.
1979); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. USAFORM Hail Pool, Inc., 523 F.2d 744, 758 (5th Cir.
1975) (corporate form will be disregarded if refusal to do so "would work an injustice on
innocent third parties"). The courts will frequently "pierce the corporate veil" of a one-
man corporation to hold the owner personally liable to claims the corporation cannot sat-
isfy. H.W. BALLANTINE, supra note 11, § 6.
Prof. Ballantine has noted:
If a corporation is organized as a 'sham, a delusion, and a snare,' fraudulent in in-
tent and execution, wholly without capital, and the business is carried on in such a
way that the corporation will have no assets to meet its debts, it may well be held
that the associates cannot set up such a 'straw man' corporation to escape individual
liability. Even though on the face of the incorporation papers there is a regular and
complete compliance with the incorporation statute, the fraudulent use of the corpo-
rate entity may be ineffectual to exempt the dishonest associates from personal
liability.
Id.
" See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 773 n.21 (1984);
Sunkist Growers Inc. v. Winkler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962). The
Court in both cases was called upon to examine the status of two corporations with respect
to sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, to determine if these corporations were capable of
conspiracy thereunder. The Court concluded that substance and not form should deter-
mine whether a separately incorporated entity is capable of conspiracy under the Act. Cop-
perweld, 467 U.S. at 771-77.
" See supra note 30. When "piercing the corporate veil" the courts view the owner of
the corporation as the alter-ego of his corporation. The owner is considered inseparable
from the corporate entity, and is therefore not able to use the organization he has created
as a shield from liability. The owner is held liable for transactions as if he had made them
in his personal capacity. Therefore, the owner of the one-man corporation is tied to the
corporation as though he were a member of a partnership. It is suggested that if the owner
of a one-man corporation can have liability imputed to him regardless of the form in which
he conducts his business, he should also be allowed to assert an important constitutional
privilege regardless of that form. Cf. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York.- Liberalizing
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porations, since the owner and his business are typically organi-
cally related, and not discrete unrelated entities.
To divest the owner of a one-man corporation of the privilege
against self-incrimination would emasculate the policy behind the
fifth amendment privilege. 3 The privilege is traditionally invoked
to protect one from being subjected "to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt. '3 4 The Framers of the Con-
stitution intimated that an integral element of a free society was
that no one should be made to contribute to his own conviction
unwillingly. 5 The owner of a one-man corporation would be sub-
ject to the very abuses which the fifth amendment was fashioned
to guard against if he were denied the privilege simply because he
chose the corporate form." It is submitted that the policy goals
which undergird the privilege would be thwarted if this were
allowed.
B. The Wording of the Subpoena Duces Tecum: Doing Indirectly What
Cannot Be Done Directly
It is submitted that the wording used in the subpoena issued to
the corporation or custodian of records is critical in determining
if the production of the documents will compel incriminating tes-
timonial communication. If the subpoena is worded in a way that
could be interpreted as asking a person to supply incriminating
testimonial communication, that person will not be held in con-
tempt for refusing to testify.37 If the person subpoenaed is the tar-
the Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 24, 25 (1981); Israels, The Close
Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 488 (1948); Note, Piercing the Corporate Law
Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under Federal and Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 853
(1982); see also Glanzer, Schiffman, & Packman, supra note 5, at 899-900. One commenta-
tor has suggested that it would be anomalous to deprive a one-man corporation of the fifth
amendment privilege while allowing a sole proprietor with a hundred employees to invoke
it. Id.
= See supra note 1.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964); see supra notes 1-2 and ac-
companying text.
3 L. LEVY, supra note 1, at 430.
' See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525, 531 (3d Cir. 1985) (Becker, J., con-
curring). Justice Becker noted that the wording of the subpoena as issued to Brown consti-
tuted an interrogatory asking if it was he who prepared the requested documents. Id. Jus-
tice Becker further stated that compliance with the subpoena would have provided an
187
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get of the grand jury investigation, it is more likely that the prose-
cutor is attempting to secure vital testimony from the target
himself and not the corporation. 8 Prosecutors frequently will art-
fully draft a subpoena which on its face compels a corporation to
produce documents, but, in effect, elicits information from an in-
dividual.39 Such is the case with the sole owner of a one-man
corporation.
In the Civil Rights arena, the courts are especially careful to
assure that an individual is not deprived of his constitutional
rights, either directly or indirectly, by governmental activities.40
Reasoning by analogy, therefore, it is submitted that it would not
be consistent with this doctrine to allow a prosecutor to serve a
corporation with a subpoena duces tecum knowing that the corpo-
ration is run solely by the target of the investigation. The prose-
answer to that question amounting to incriminating testimonial communications, beyond
what the Fisher standard permitted, and therefore concluded that the contempt order is-
sued to Brown should be vacated. Id.; accord Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118, 123-24
(1957).
Compare In re Two Grand jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52 (2d Cir. 1985)
with In re Grand Jury Matter (Brown), 768 F.2d 525 (3d Cir. 1985). In Two Grand Jury
Subpoenae Duces Tecum, the intent of the prosecutor to obtain the documents of the corpo-
ration without incriminating the target was obvious in that the prosecutor conceded will-
ingly to have the documents produced by a non-target employee. In Brown, the prosecutor
would not agree to have any other officer of the corporation produce the documents, nor
would the prosecutor accept Brown's offer to have his attorney produce the documents.
:' See supra note 37.
40 Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 23 (1971). The Court in
Swann ascertained the constitutionality of a desegregation plan for a North Carolina school
system. The Court stated that the "objective in dealing with the issues presented by these
cases is to see that school authorities exclude no pupil of a racial minority from any school
directly or indirectly, on account of race .... Id. In Brown v. Califano, 627 F.2d 1221,
1227 (D.C. Cir. 1980), eighteen school children brought an action against the Department
of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) for an unauthorized attempt by HEW to amend
certain federal provisions assuring nondiscrimination in public schools receiving federal
support. The court held that "congress explicitly intended that HEW could not use its
power to require 'directly or indirectly' student transportation beyond the school closest to
their home." Id. In Hooks v. Wainright, 352 F. Supp. 163 (M.D. Fla. 1972), an action was
brought by inmates against the Florida State Director of Corrections for the Director's
failure to provide inmates with an adequate law library. Id. at 166. The court held that
failure to provide an adequate law library for the inmates would discriminate against im-
poverished inmates in that they would be unable to retain counsel to appeal their convic-
tions whereas the more wealthy inmates were so able. Id. at 167. Since the state could not
deprive the inmates of an opportunity to obtain legal assistance at their own expense, fail-
ure to provide an adequate law library would amount to an indirect sanction, as the less
wealthy inmates would be denied access to the courts due to a lack of legal authority on
which to base their appeals. Id. at 167-68.
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cutor would be indirectly depriving the target of his privilege
against self-incrimination by compelling the corporation to com-
ply with the subpoena, since there would be no other officer avail-
able to produce the documents.
C. Merger of Capacity
When a corporate director brings an action on behalf of the
corporation, and at the same time is the real party in interest in
the litigation, he is subject to a counterclaim in his personal capac-
ity.' 1 Therefore the courts have readily "merged" the corporate
director's capacity with his personal capacity, thereby subjecting
the director to liability. This "merger" indicates that the strict
corporate form should be disregarded when the sole owner acts
on behalf of the corporate entity and has sufficient stake in its
operation to be affected personally. It is suggested that this
"merger of capacity" should also be utilized to accord the owner
of a one-man corporation the privilege against self-incrimination.
It seems anomalous to permit a merger of capacity in cases deal-
ing with financial liability and not to permit it where a fundamen-
tal constitutional privilege is involved.
III. THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE
Though a corporation, regardless of its size, has no fifth amend-
41 Conant v. Schnall, 33 App. Div. 2d 326, 307 N.Y.S.2d 902 (3d Dep't 1970). In Conant,
the defendant agreed to buy out plaintiff's interest in a corporation of which they were the
sole shareholders. Id. at 327, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 904. Defendant refused to make any final
payments, resulting in plaintiff's commencing an action against defendant in his capacity as
a corporate officer for the balance owed. Id. Defendant counterclaimed in his personal
capacity against plaintiff on the theory of waste and mismanagement. Id. Plaintiff argued
that the counterclaim should have been dismissed as defendant could only counterclaim in
the capacity in which he was sued. Id. at 328, 307 N.Y.S.2d at 905. The court refused to
dismiss the counterclaim, reasoning that the general rule requiring a person to counter-
claim in the same capacity in which he is sued, breaks down when that person has a real
party interest in the litigation. Id.
It is suggested that the court here merged the individual and personal capacity of the
owner of a one-man corporation. It is further suggested that this case stands for the pro-
position that the owner of a one-man corporation maintains an identity inseparable from
that of his business as his capacity as an individual and corporate director are one and the
same. See Geer Jr. & Co. v. Fagan, 255 App. Div. 253, 7 N.Y.S.2d 395 (3d Dep't 1938);
Anderson v. Carlson, 201 App. Div. 260, 194 N.Y.S.2d 112 (2d Dep't 1922).
42 See supra note 41.
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ment privilege against self-incrimination, 3 it has been held that
the owner of a sole proprietorship may assert his personal fifth
amendment privilege with respect to the records of his business."
In recent years the courts have utilized a test whereby an organi-
zation is either defined as a collective or non-collective entity.48
The organization is deemed to be a collective entity when it is
comprised of many persons whose interests are represented by the
collective view of the entire group.'8 Such a group will not be ac-
corded the fifth amendment privilege since the privilege against
self-incrimination is personal in nature.' Accordingly, documents
of a corporation held in a representative capacity cannot be the
subject of this personal privilege.48 On the other hand, a non-col-
lective entity such as a sole proprietorship is afforded the privi-
lege . 9 Recently, however, courts have construed this standard
and found certain partnerships and organizations to be non-collec-
tive entities while other such organizations have been deemed
43 See supra notes 9-1 1 and accompanying text.
", United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). The Doe Court held that while the contents
of business records of a sole-proprietorship are not subject to the owner's personal fifth
amendment privilege, the owner may assert his privilege over his business records if he is
not guaranteed a grant of use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003. 465 U.S. at
617.
"' See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701-02 (1944); accord Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 92-93 (1974). The White Court has articulated the collective entity test:
The test, rather, is whether one can fairly say under all circumstances, that a partic-
ular type of organization has a character so impersonal in the scope of its member-
ship and activities that it cannot be said to embody or represent the purely private or
personal interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common group in-
terests only.
White, 322 U.S. at 701; see also M. BERGE.R, supra note 1, at 61 (general discussion of White
standard).
In White a union official sought to assert his personal fifth amendment privilege over
records of a labor union. White, 322 U.S. at 696. The Court held that the official possessed
the records of a collective group in a representative capacity, and was therefore, precluded
from asserting his personal privilege with respect to these documents. Id. at 699. See gener-
ally Note, The Constitutional Rights of Associations to Assert the Privilege Against Sef-Incrimina-
tion, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 394, 407-14 (1964) (application of White test to several organiza-
tional forms).
4' Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92; White, 322 U.S. at 699. When the organization performs organ-
ized institutional activities, and takes on an identity distinct and independent from that of
its members, it will be viewed by the courts as a collective entity. Bellis, 417 U.S. at 92.
4 See supra notes 2-3.
4" See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text.
4" United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617. The privilege extended only to the act of
producing the documents and not to the contents of the business records. Id.
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"collective entities."50
IV. APPLICATION OF THE COLLECTIVE ENTITY DOCTRINE
Courts thus far have not utilized this test with respect to one-
man corporations, reasoning that since the corporate form is used
to gain certain attendant benefits, it will not be disregarded in or-
der to shield business records from production.51 This argument,
at best, is without foundation. Admittedly, a corporation is af-
forded certain benefits as a result of its f6rm. 2 However, these
benefits should not outweigh the important constitutional privi-
lege lost as a result of incorporation."a When these are balanced,
it is submitted that there is no rational basis for depriving the
owner of a one-man corporation of the much valued privilege
against self-incrimination.
It is suggested that the collective entity test should be applied to
" See United States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Slutsky
court applied the White standard objectively in order to ascertain the substance of the or-ganization. Here a family partnership owned and operated a hotel in New York. In finding
the organization to have an identity inseparable from its members, the court noted:
ITjhe partners here, give their personal attention to the day-to-day business activi-
ties of the partnership. Only the partners and their two sons can sign checks, and all
four live on the business premises.... [The organization had] only the size, not the
nature of a corporation.
Id. at 1108; But see In re September, 1975 Special Grand Jury, 435 F. Supp. 538, 543 (N.D.
Ind. 1977). In this case a trailer park owned and operated by a family partnership was
deemed to have possessed an institutional identity apart from its constituents. The court
based its decision on testimony by one of the partners, that he performed work at the
trailer park in both his personal capacity and in his capacity as member of the partnership.
Id.
It is suggested that this case stands for the proposition that the critical issue in determin-
ing if an organization has a separate institutional identity is whether the owner demon-
strates such an identity to third parties. In the one-man corporation situation, the organiza-
tion can only have the identity of its owner simply because it cannot exist without him.
61 In re Two Grand Jury Subpoenae Duces Tecum, 769 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1985). The
court in this case construed Bellis as standing for the proposition that the corporate form is
chosen by the shareholders to gain certain attendant benefits, and should therefore, not be
disregarded to shield documents from production. Id.
It is submitted that such a construction favoring form over substance is inconsistent with
the collective entity test applied in Beltis. When applying the collective entity doctrine, the
courts examine the substance of the organization to determine whether or not it has an
identity apart from its members.
52 See generally H.G. HENN., J.R. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS, §§ 68-76 (1983) (gen-
eral discussion of the benefits accorded to incorporated business entities).
63 See generally C. MCCORMICK, supra note 2 §§ 128-29 (overview of the fifth amendment
privilege with respect to corporations).
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the one-man corporation in light of the proposed analyses." Fo-
cusing on the substance of a one-man corporation over its form, it
cannot be said to have an identity distinct and apart from the
identity of its owner.8 5 Since the scope of the one-man corpora-
tion's activities is not impersonal, it embodies the personal interest
of the owner. 6 Having recognized that the corporate form does
not necessarily suggest a detached business run by absentee mem-
bers,57 indicative of a collective entity, courts should view the sub-
stance of a one-man corporation as a non-collective entity entitled
to the privilege against self-incrimination.
When viewed as a non-collective entity, the one-man corpora-
tion is inextricably intertwined with its owner to such an extent
that service of a subpoena duces tecum on the corporation necessa-
rily compels its owner to comply therewith.8 To indirectly compel
the owner of a one-man corporation to possibly incriminate him-
self is as egregious a violation as direct compulsion to incriminate
himself.59
It is further suggested that the notion of merger of capacity60 in
See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
58 Cf. United States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105, 1108 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). The court in
Slutsky clearly found that due to the personal contact maintained between the family and
their partnership, the organization, albeit large and successful, was not a distinct institu-
tional organization. Id. at 1108. The several members were held to have close enough
contacts to the business to allow them to invoke their fifth amendment privilege with re-
spect to the records of the organization. Id. at 1109.
Reasoning by analogy, it is submitted that a person who is the sole member of a business
organization maintains the same personal contact with his business, regardless of the fact
that he has incorporated that business.
"Cf. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. at 1108. It has been suggested that "truly private or personal
associations would be entitled to assert the privilege because they are really not separate
from the interest of the individual who comprises them." M. BERGER, supra note 1, at 61.
" See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, -, 328 N.E.2d 505, 512
(1975); Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 416, 199 N.E. 641, 643 (1936); Topper v. Park
Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc.; 107 Misc. 2d 25, 32-34, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359, 365 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980). The court in Donahue noted that inherent in the close corporation is a fidu-
ciary duty between the members similar to that which exists between partners in a partner-
ship. Donahue, 367 Mass. at -, 328 N.E.2d at 512. The court also noted that this duty
arose because ownership and management were in control of the same person. Id.
as See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. See also M. BEROER, supra note 1, at 61
(degree of personal affiliation should determine applicability of privilege). Professor Berger
has observed that to extract information from a truly private association "through its agent
is to effectively force him to provide his own rather than the entity's records, thereby com-
pelling self-incrimination in violation of the fifth amendment." Id.
' Cf. supra note 40 and accompanying text.
so See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text; cf. Conant v. Schnall, 33 App. Div. 2d
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the context of a one-man corporation is consonant with its status
as a non-collective entity. That is, since a one-man corporation
embodies the personal interests of its owner,"1 the owner is at
once acting on behalf of himself and the corporate entity, and
therefore should be afforded the much guarded privilege against
self-incrimination.
6 2
CONCLUSION
In light of the analyses which have emerged through case law
and consistent with the policy that undergirds the privilege
against self-incrimination, it is clear that the owner of a one-man
corporation should not be compelled to produce documents pur-
suant to a subpoena duces tecum. Having focused on the essence of
the corporation, courts should extend their awareness to owners
of one-man corporations so that the assertion of the privilege
against self-incrimination is not made to depend on the organiza-
tional form one chooses.
Anthony M. Battisti
326, 307 N.Y.S.2d 902 (3d Dep't 1970); supra note 41. If the owner of a one-man corpora-
tion possesses sufficient contacts with the organization so as to establish in him a real party
interest in any litigation to which the corporation becomes a party, it follows that the activ-
ity in which the one-man corporation engages represents the personal interests of the per-
son controlling the corporation. This organization with its personal contact between the
owner and the business, and the inseparable identity of the owner and the business would
clearly be viewed as a non-collective entity under the White test.
" See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
" Id.
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